The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction by Cisneros, Laura A.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
2010
The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction
Distinction: A Useful Fiction
Laura A. Cisneros
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cisneros, Laura A., "The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction" (2010). Constitutional
Commentary. 615.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/615
!!!CISNEROS-271-CONSTITUTIONALINTGERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:51 AM 
 
71 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION 
DISTINCTION: A USEFUL FICTION 
Laura A. Cisneros* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, theories of constitutional interpretation 
have experienced a sea change. Some scholars have claimed that 
the old debate between originalism and nonoriginalism has gone 
by the wayside and that it is less accurate nowadays to describe 
the differences between these theories of American 
constitutional interpretation in terms of originalism and “non” 
anything.1 Others have suggested that the differences are better 
conceived of in terms of variations within the originalism family. 
For example, Jeffrey Rosen in 1997 exclaimed, “We are all 
originalists now.”2 More recently, that notion was repeated by 
some3 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.4 Even so, not all agree.5 
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. LL.M., 
University of Wisconsin Law School; J.D., Loyola University New Orleans School of 
Law. Thank you to the Section on Constitutional Law for their invitation to contribute to 
the panel, “The Interpretation—Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law,” at the 
2010 AALS Annual Meeting. I would also like to thank the panel participants and 
attendees for an engaging and memorable experience. I am particularly grateful to 
Golden Gate University School of Law for its summer grant program and general 
support of my scholarship. Thank you also to my former colleagues at Thurgood 
Marshall School of Law for their encouragement and support. 
 1. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1194 
(2008) (noting that since the 1990’s the legal academy has generally accepted that the 
alternative to “originalism” is “not ‘non’ anything, but rather the conventional, 
historically grounded, traditions of constitutional interpretation”).  
 2. Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin: The Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and its 
Intellectual Incoherence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 26 (book review) (“Most judges 
and legal scholars who want to remain within the boundaries of respectable 
constitutional discourse agree that the original meaning of the Constitution and its 
amendments has some degree of pertinence to the question of what the Constitution 
means today.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Dave Kopel, Conservative Activists Key to DC Handgun Decision, 
HUMAN EVENTS (June 27, 2008), http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=27229 (In 
Heller, “The Scalia majority and Stevens dissent are both argued mostly in terms of 
original meaning and textualism. Both Scalia and Stevens delve very deeply into 18th and 
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Ultimately, differences between originalism and 
nonoriginalism remain.6 In fact, not only are there a wide range 
of alternatives to originalism,7 there are a number of variations 
 
19th century sources on the meaning of words, and the original public understanding of 
the Second Amendment. At least in terms of the Second Amendment, we are all 
originalists now.”); see also Dahlia Lithwick, The Dark Matter of Our Cherished 
Document: What You See in the Constitution Isn’t What You Get, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2008, 
2:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2204377/ (book review) (“The liberals and 
conservatives [in Heller] took turns trying to outdo one another as ‘textualists’ and 
‘originalists’ and ‘strict constructionists.’”). 
 4. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799, 2821–22 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms and although that right was not 
unlimited, the District of Columbia’s statutory ban on handgun possession in the home 
and its requirement that all firearms in the household be kept in a manner that prevented 
their immediate use for self-defense violated the Second Amendment). 
 5. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Heller High Water?: The Future of Originalism, 3 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 325, 326 (2009) (arguing against the “we are all originalists” 
claim, stating “Not only are we not all originalists now, but very few of us are originalists 
now.”) (emphasis in original); see also Cass Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: 
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246–48 (2008) (arguing that the most 
plausible explanation for the Court’s decision in Heller is rooted in the idea of living 
constitutionalism, not originalism. Professor Sunstein claims that Heller is more closely 
related to Griswold v. Connecticut—where the Court struck down Connecticut’s ban on 
the use of contraceptives by married couples—because both “narrow rulings with strong 
minimalist features,” are best explained as responsive to national consensus and 
contemporary values “notwithstanding the Court’s preoccupation [in Heller] with 
constitutional text and history”). For additional analyses of Heller as an example of living 
constitutionalism, see Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living 
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1551 (2009). 
 6. Although (as noted above) some have suggested that the alternative to 
originalism is not “non” anything, for purposes of clarity, this article uses the term 
“nonoriginalism” or “nonoriginalist” to represent the diversity of alternative approaches 
to originalism. 
 7. A full discussion of these alternative approaches to constitutional interpretation 
is beyond the scope of this article. But see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism 
and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 557 (2009) (arguing that living 
constitutionalism is harmonious with what he defines as “framework originalism”); Jack 
M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) 
[hereinafter Balkin, Original Meaning]; Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional 
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional 
Redemption] (presenting a “theory of text and principle” which he defines as 
“redemptive constitutionalism”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence 
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94 (1987); 
Howard Gillman, Political Development and the Origins of the Living Constitution 
(Digital Commons, Paper 53, 2006), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland. 
edu/schmooze_papers/53; Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes 
in a Dead Constitution, SLATE (Aug. 29, 2005, 5:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2125226/ (“We are all living constitutionalists now.”). For a theory that holds that 
extraordinary popular mobilizations have revised the Constitution’s commands from 
time to time see Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 
(2007). For a discussion describing constitutional change through popular mobilization 
and other varieties of living constitutionalism see Larry D. Kramer, Popular 
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 967–74 (2004). 
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within originalism itself.8 New Originalism has emerged as one 
such variation. One of the fundamental distinctions between Old 
and New Originalism is that the former tended to focus on the 
original intentions of the authors of a particular legal text 
whereas the latter tends to focus on the “original public 
meaning” of the particular legal text, which is the meaning that 
the intended audience would have assigned to a given word, 
phrase, or sentence at the time it was drafted.9 The full contours 
of New Originalism as distinguished from Old Originalism are 
beyond the scope of this paper. Generally speaking, however, 
New Originalism explains the theory of American constitutional 
interpretation as something of a dual process: First, one must 
look to the original public meaning (interpretation) and when 
that runs out, look to other sources that might reliably fill out 
the contours of that interpretation (e.g., history and tradition 
surrounding the text, the structure of the text, court precedent, 
etc).10 The second part of this process is what is often referred to 
as “construction.” 
This is unobjectionable so far as it goes. It suggests that the 
break from Old to New Originalism was something of a natural 
development. Think about it: the originalism that thrived in the 
1960s through the mid-1980s concentrated on (at least) two 
commitments: (1) pushing against the doctrinal developments of 
the Warren Court and (2) constraining judicial activity by 
limiting judicial discretion.11 By the early 1990s, the transition 
from the Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court made the judicial 
opinions that old originalists were railing against less frequent, 
 
 8. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
26 (2001) (“Originalism comes in a bewildering variety of colors and flavors.”); Mitchell 
N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9–16 (2009) (“[L]iterally 
thousands of discrete theses can plausibly claim to be originalist”); Martin S. Flaherty, 
The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1812 (1996) (“If ever a term muddied 
as much as it clarified, ‘originalism’ is it.”). 
 9. For a discussion of original meaning, original intent, and original public 
meaning see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926–33 (2009).  
 10. For more in-depth discussions about the specifics and developments contained 
in New Originalism, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION]; KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL 
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION]; 
Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 7; Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 7.  
 11. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 690 (2005) (“The old originalism was 
designed to promote judicial restraint and criticize the judicial innovations of liberal 
judges in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s.”).  
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thereby making these two commitments less necessary.12 What 
surfaced afterward and replaced the commitment to subverting 
“activist” theory (and practice) was a need to develop a positive 
constitutional doctrine that was (1) based on the text of the 
Constitution and (2) capable of guiding the actual activities of 
federal judges. Indeed, as conservatives came to dominate the 
Supreme Court, originalism needed to provide a workable 
theoretical foundation to support majority opinions, i.e., create a 
constructive governing philosophy. To a large extent, I think 
New Originalism in general, and the constitutional 
interpretation/construction debate in particular is responding 
well to that call. However, it is hardly an effort without strife, 
both internal and external. Even among New Originalists, the 
debate over where interpretation ends and where construction 
begins is contested, as is the battle over whether the judiciary 
plays a dominant role or subservient role in the construction 
effort. 
The source of the conflict, ironically enough, is located in a 
theoretical position that nearly all New Originalists share—
namely, that constitutional interpretation requires some degree 
of judgment. The interpretation/construction distinction admits 
that at a certain point interpretation (original public meaning) 
exhausts itself and can no longer provide the linguistic cues 
necessary to explain the text or guide our application of it, and 
that when original public meaning runs out, constitutional 
meaning must be constructed through the exercise of judgment. 
Recent work discussing the distinction displays a range of 
attitudes with respect to who gets to make the judgment and the 
form that judgment should take. Some writers have expanded 
the debate beyond the originally offered definitions for 
“interpretation” and “construction” and argue that 
“construction” has little to do with finding textual meaning at all, 
but rather is related solely to the implementation of policy and 
constitutional decisions—i.e., a purely political activity. Others 
have asserted that the distinction between interpretation and 
construction does not capture a real difference—that the two 
 
 12. For an analysis of the Rehnquist Court focusing on its pro-state power 
federalism opinions, opinions overturning affirmative action programs, and opinions 
reversing liberal precedents on criminal procedure, see THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST 
ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL 
CONSERVATISM 2 (2004) (“Judicial conservatism born in reaction to the liberal judicial 
activism of the Warren Court has come to create not judicial restraint but instead its own 
version of judicial activism.”).  
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activities are so intertwined as to be inseparable, that they are 
connected phases of a single task. As I will discuss below, I tend 
to pitch my tent in the second camp and view the line between 
interpretation and construction as artificial, as it defies all 
practical attempts to draw it consistently from case to case. No 
one has developed a formula for predictably discerning between 
the two activities and it is doubtful that such a formula, if 
devised and presented, would win more than minority support 
among constitutional scholars. 
Nevertheless, I think the distinction is important, in that it 
reminds theorists of the dual nature of constitutional 
interpretation—between what the Constitution means and how 
the Constitution can be implemented. This is a distinction which 
should not be overlooked or conflated. Ultimately, the 
distinction may only prove useful in trying to figure out what the 
Court is doing rather than trying to figure out what the Court 
should do. Still, by incorporating actual judicial activity into the 
theoretical discussion of American constitutional interpretation, 
the interpretation/construction distinction appropriately 
highlights two key areas for further analysis: how to determine 
what the Constitution means (i.e., document fidelity) and how a 
particular institutional actor can implement that meaning (i.e., 
institutional obligation). Against this backdrop, this Article 
argues that the constitutional interpretation/construction 
distinction is a fiction, but a useful one in constitutional law. 
Part I briefly describes the interpretation/construction 
distinction as an artificial construct—a fiction.13 The many 
commentaries on the subject encompass such a wide range of 
positions that the distinction, to the extent it truly exists at all, 
does so in the eye of each individual beholder. In Part II, I argue 
that the distinction, even if understood as a fiction, is 
nevertheless relevant because it can be used to bridge the 
expanse between originalist and nonoriginalist (or, if one 
prefers, between “strong” and “weak” originalist) theories of 
American constitutional interpretation. Put another way, the 
fiction is useful. In Part III then, I turn to the idea of usefulness. 
Focusing on how the distinction may be relevant, I suggest that 
maintaining a distinction between interpretation and 
construction is ultimately positive because it offers a new 
language system in which to continue a more meaningful debate 
 
 13. For a discussion of the use of the word “fiction,” see infra notes 23–28 and 
accompanying text. 
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between different interpretive theories. In other words, the 
appeal of the distinction is its ability to move constitutional 
commentary away from ideological entrenchment to a more 
meaningful discussion about both the process and substance of 
constitutional adjudication. 
I. THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION 
DISTINCTION AS FICTION 
In the 1990s, some constitutional theorists began to craft a 
distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional construction, and this work has received renewed 
interest of late, although even those who claim to see this 
distinction disagree on exactly what it is. Some frame the 
distinction as a bright line between two distinct activities. Larry 
Solum, for example, defines the distinction as follows: 
“Interpretation is the activity that aims to recover the linguistic 
meaning (or semantic content) of a legal text. Construction is the 
activity that aims to produce juridical meaning (or legal content) 
that is authorized by a legal text.”14 Thus, for Solum, 
interpretation is a kind of archaeology in which the meaning of 
the words and phrases of the Constitution is determined through 
a close reading of the text, which itself is informed by a strong 
knowledge of the language as it was used at the time of 
composition. Construction, by contrast, is something altogether 
different. In Solum’s view, construction is what happens when 
judicial and non-judicial actors take the product of the 
interpretation enterprise—i.e., the recovered meaning of the 
text—and then implement that meaning through legal rules that 
govern everyday social and political life. Note also that, for 
Solum, judges are intimately involved in the construction effort. 
Keith Whittington also presents interpretation and con-
struction as two distinct activities, but he divides up the tasks a 
little differently. His early work drew a sharp line between the 
two activities and argued that courts were principally responsible 
for and should be limited to interpretation, while the political 
 
 14. Professor Solum articulated this most recent iteration of the 
interpretation/construction distinction. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 9, at 973 (providing an 
expanded definition of “construction” as “the activity of translating the semantic content 
of a legal text into legal rules, paradigmatically in cases where the meaning of the text is 
vague”); Lawrence Solum, Graber on the Interpretation-Construction Distinction at the 
AALS, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Jan. 13, 2010, 4:19 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/ 
legaltheory/2010/01/graber-on-the-interpretationconstruction-distinction-panel-at-the-
aals.html. 
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branches were principally responsible for and should direct 
constitutional construction.15 Whittington’s later work eased up 
on the force of this initial argument. He now acknowledges that 
courts have a role to play in constitutional construction, but that 
the supremacy of those judicial constructions are ultimately 
permitted to exist through the grace of the political branches 
who use judicial construction as a mechanism for political 
advantage.16 For example, if political actors want “cover” on an 
unpopular issue, they can express their personal view on the 
issue itself, while maintaining their commitment to enforce the 
decisions of the Court as the law of the land. The abortion 
debate is a ready example. As the Court placed abortion on the 
national agenda amid polarization among the Democratic Party, 
then-President Jimmy Carter could not take a clear position on 
the issue without marginalizing part of the Democratic Party. 
Whittington discusses how President Carter, whose own 
“conservative and evangelical characteristics appealed to pro-life 
voters” deferred to the Court when asked in 1980 how he could 
“support abortion.”17 Nevertheless, Whittington’s basic position 
has not changed. He still places primacy of constitutional 
construction in the hands of the political branches. Judicial 
participation in the construction phase should occur only when it 
serves the interests of the political branches. 
Others retain the dual framework, but adjust the line 
between the two. Mitch Berman expands Solum’s definition of 
“interpretation” to include other modalities, not just semantic or 
linguistic content that point to “what the law is.”18 Still others 
argue that a variety of possible interpretation/construction 
distinctions exist, but that each depends on the nature of the 
problem being addressed. In a thoughtful and thought-provoking 
post, Mark Graber conceptualizes various types of 
 
 15. See WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 10; WHITTINGTON, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 10.  
 16. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
(2007). 
 17. Id. at 66–68. 
 18. Mitchell, N. Berman, Constitutional Constructions and Constitutional Decision 
Rules: Further Thoughts on the Carving of Implementation Space, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
39, 45 (2010). For a discussion of these “other modalities” see PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
FATE] (discussing a modal theory of the Constitution, which conceives of six valid forms 
or “modalities” of constitutional argument: historical, textual, doctrinal, structural, 
prudential, and ethical). See also PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (elaborating on the 
modal theory from Constitutional Fate).  
!!!CISNEROS-271-CONSTITUTIONALINTGERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:51 AM 
78 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:71 
 
interpretation/construction distinctions formed around various 
problems. Among other things, Graber posits one can express 
the interpretation/construction distinction in terms of certainty: 
interpretation takes place when the meaning of the Constitution 
is clear or when the interpreter claims to have found an objective 
“right” answer to what the particular constitutional provision 
means. On the other hand, construction takes place when the 
meaning of the particular constitutional provision is contested or 
the answer is not objectively correct. Another possible 
distinction is one addressing meaning or methods. In that 
instance, interpretation describes the activity of looking for the 
original public meaning of the Constitution while construction 
describes all other forms of constitutional analysis. Still another 
distinction between the two can be offered to explain the 
difference between meaning and implementation: interpretation 
occurs when we look for the meaning of the Constitution while 
construction occurs when we “operationalize that meaning into 
principles of constitutional law.”19 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, are those that do not 
see a line at all. For example, Rick Hills argues that the two 
activities cannot easily be separated, “pragmatically speaking, 
the meaning of a constitutional provision is its 
implementation.”20 Although here Hills frames his comments in 
terms of “implementation” rather than “construction,” the two 
operate as functional equivalents. Indeed, Hills’ work in this 
area develops and extends Richard Fallon’s work focusing on 
the rules courts develop to “implement” constitutional 
commands. Fallon defines “implementation” in terms that are 
strikingly similar to the current understanding of the 
“construction” prong of the distinction.21 Fallon’s 2001 book 
took a macro-level perspective to discussing doctrinal 
developments. In particular, Fallon discussed the Court’s 
necessity of rules-construction based on constitutional meaning 
to decide particular cases. He argued that the majority of the 
 
 19. Mark Graber, The Interpretation/Construction Distinctions, BALKINIZATION 
BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:41 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/01/much-constitutional-
theory-over-past.html. 
 20. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation 
and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006) (emphasis in original). 
 21. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) (“The 
term implementation invites recognition that the function of putting the Constitution 
effectively into practice is a necessarily collaborative one, which often requires 
compromise and accommodation. It also emphasizes the practical, frequently strategic 
aspects of the Court’s work [including] the formulation of constitutional rules, formulas, 
and tests.”). 
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time the Court was not choosing between originalist and 
nonoriginalist theories, but instead was simply applying or 
adjusting rules from precedent cases to meet new 
circumstances.22 
The disagreement over whether and where to draw the line 
dividing interpretation from construction suggests that the point 
of distinction between the two cannot be fixed by the 
unwavering certitude of “fact” but may be shaped instead by the 
fluid inventiveness of “fiction.” Here, I am indebted to and tend 
to share Lewis H. LaRue’s explanation and use of the word 
“fiction” in his 1995 work Constitutional Law as Fiction: 
Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority.23 LaRue states: 
The title of this book, Constitutional Law as Fiction, 
summarizes my thesis, which is that the proud towers of the 
law are built not on the level bedrock of “fact” but on the 
perplexed terrain of “fiction,” that judicial opinions are filled 
with “stories” that purport to be “factual” but that instead are 
“fictional,” and furthermore, that these “fictions” could not 
be eliminated without crippling the legal enterprise.24 
LaRue’s essential claim is that “legal discourse is made of 
stories that are ‘fictional.’”25 He roots the power of the judicial 
enterprise in the persuasiveness of the judicial opinion and 
asserts that “[w]ithout persuasion, law could not be law, and 
without fiction, there would be no persuasion.”26 Still, he is 
careful to qualify his use of the metaphor “law as fiction” as 
descriptive rather than evaluative and as only one alternative 
way in which to describe the law, acknowledging neither that his 
 
 22. Id. at 5 (“Especially in formulating tests such as these, the Court does not 
characteristically engage in historical or moral analysis, nor does it attempt to determine 
whether particular events in the world come within the semantic meaning of a 
constitutional norm. Rather, the Court devises and implements strategies for enforcing 
constitutional values.”); see also id. at 76–101 (outlining and analyzing “seven kinds of 
tests that the Court frequently employs in enforcing constitutional guarantees of 
individual rights”).  
 23. LEWIS H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE 
RHETORIC OF AUTHORITY (1995). For literature that explores the connection between 
storytelling and legal argument, see LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN 
THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul D. Gewirtz eds., 1996). For work applying narrative 
theory to law, see John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A 
Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 608–13 (2005); Eleanor Swift, Narrative 
Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime State of Mind Hearsay, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 975, 980 n.17 (2008). 
 24. LARUE, supra note 23, at 8. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 11. 
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description is (or should be) the predominant one nor that his 
description necessarily or logically excludes any other.27 
The American Heritage Dictionary lists, among others, the 
following definitions for fiction: “1a. An imaginative creation or 
a pretense that does not represent actuality but has been 
invented. . . . 2. A lie. . . . 4. Law Something untrue that is 
intentionally represented as true by the narrator.”28 My use of 
the word is not in any pejorative sense. I do not mean to imply 
that the use of fiction in the law (whether in a judicial opinion or 
in an academic article) is driven by malice or the desire to 
mislead. I think that the idea of fiction is more complex than 
that. To be sure, any attempt to explain the course of events 
(e.g., a statement of facts in a brief or a factual recitation in a 
judicial opinion), opens up the possibility that the factual basis 
on which those statements or recitals rely are either incomplete 
or contain ambiguities.29 What this means then is that a certain 
amount of the creative, inventive, imaginative process must be 
used to resolve these ambiguities or fill-in an incomplete record. 
Ultimately, debate over the precise contours of 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction 
leaves us with a distinction that is neither obvious nor 
identifiable through the application of an accepted and uniform 
set of rules. One need only ask two of the five theorists discussed 
above (say, Solum and Graber) to read a Supreme Court 
opinion and they may be hard-pressed to agree as to the point at 
which the Court stopped interpreting and started constructing. 
Thus, as an aid to the practice of judging, the 
interpretation/construction distinction is largely unhelpful. This 
is largely because the discourse about the nature of the 
distinction (however one defines it) is shaped and constrained by 
normative impulses. This is not a qualitatively good or bad thing; 
simply a reality. 
Let’s take the idea of “recovering the linguistic meaning (or 
semantic content) of a legal text.” For purposes of the 
distinction, the linguistic meaning is the original public meaning 
 
 27. See id. at 11–12. 
 28. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 4th ed. 2006). 
 29. This idea of the unattainable “true/factual” past is not new. See JOHN LEWIS 
GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY 3 (2002) (“But the past . . . is something we can 
never have. For by the time we’ve become aware of what has happened it’s already 
inaccessible to us: we cannot relive, retrieve, or rerun it as we might some laboratory 
experiment or computer simulation. We can only represent it.”). 
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of the legal text. The focus on original public meaning rather 
than on original intent is one of the leading characteristics of the 
“New Originalist” movement.30 Original intent theory holds that 
interpretation of a particular legal text is (or should be) 
consistent with what the author (or ratifier) meant the provision 
to mean.31 In other words, original intent theory is primarily 
concerned with the subjective intent of the person who drafted 
(or ratified) the particular legal text. Original public meaning 
attempts to discover what the generation that drafted, ratified, 
or amended a constitutional provision understood it to mean.32 
While this sounds like something that can be discovered, like 
excavating an historical artifact, presentism bars full discovery of 
the original public meaning because present-day ideas and 
perspectives cannot help but be anachronistically introduced 
into depictions or interpretations of the past.33 
 
 30. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 10, at 87–152; Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).   
 31. Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a 
Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1986) (“The standard of interpretation 
applied by the judiciary must focus on the text and the drafter’s original intent.”); see 
also, e.g., Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 774 
(1987) (calling for “a jurisprudence based on the intent of the drafters”). But see 
WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing “ratifying intent”). 
 32. But see Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning, supra note 7, at 295–311 (offering a 
variation on ‘new originalism’ that uses a ‘text-plus’ method to expand the understanding 
of original public meaning to include the original generation’s understanding of the text 
plus their understanding of the original principle the text was meant to serve); Balkin, 
Constitutional Redemption, supra note 7. 
 33. Historians and legal scholars have both discussed the difficulties of presentism 
and questioned the ability to make legitimate connections between the past and present, 
see, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 181–84 
(1996); MICHAEL KAMMEN, SELVAGES AND BIASES: THE FABRIC OF HISTORY IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 116–17 (1987) (observing that in the mid-twentieth century 
professional historians shifted their focus from a search for a “usable past” to the 
“‘pastness of the past,’ which means to accept the past on its own terms rather than to 
transmogrify it into our own contemporary frame of reference”); PETER NOVICK, THAT 
NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
PROFESSION 12, 99 (1988); Stuart Banner, Legal History and Legal Scholarship, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 37 (1998) (“History, or at least history written according to the 
conventions of late twentieth century professional historians, with an emphasis on the 
ways in which the past differed from the present—history as an account of the pastness of 
the past, as the standard expression goes—enormously complicates the task of legal 
argument.”); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 176 (2006); Jonathan D. Martin, Note, 
Historians at the Gate: Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1526 (2003) (Originalist history fails “to understand the past on its 
own terms and maintain a respect for its integrity”) (quoting Richard B. Bernstein, 
Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1987)); . 
!!!CISNEROS-271-CONSTITUTIONALINTGERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:51 AM 
82 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:71 
 
Aside from distorting original public meaning with present-
day values and perceptions and selectively using the historical 
evidence at their disposal, those who employ history as an aid to 
constitutional interpretation also impose presentist teleology on 
the history of the United States Constitution itself. Indeed, there 
is the tendency to approach the history of the Constitution as 
one of linear progress. The history of the Constitution is 
typically articulated as one of steady progress toward a more 
desirable democratic order. And this progression typically 
presents itself as a continuous development from past to present, 
with each step bringing us closer to the dream of civil rights and 
liberties first expressed by our Founding Fathers.34 Among the 
various fictions surrounding the Constitution, this one may be 
the most pervasive and accepted, as well as the most difficult to 
reconcile with the actual historical record. I suggest, then, that a 
singular “true” original public meaning cannot be entirely based 
on historical fact, because although we may know something 
about the types of reasons and types of understandings some of 
the original generation may have held about a particular 
constitutional provision, it is impossible to gather evidence from 
all or even most of the people who comprised the original 
generation. Aside from the fact that such evidence is limited to 
the view of elite actors, we still need to be mindful of problems 
with verifying the motives underlying the evidence that we can 
gather, such as diaries, notes, letters, minutes, etc.35 Because of 
the inability to find and compile everything they need to tell 
their story, historians typically fill in gaps in evidence; as LaRue 
notes, people “build bridges between facts to interpret human 
conduct.”36 In this regard, the search for “original public 
meaning”—no less than the search for “original intent”—is 
likely to yield an incomplete and/or flawed understanding of the 
text. 
 
 34. See, STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY 
TO POLITICS, 166 (1996). For a discussion of how this reading of the present into the past 
colors constitutional argument see generally, DAVID HACKETT FISHER, HISTORIANS’ 
FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970); G. EDWARD WHITE, 
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815–1835 (1991); Saul Cornell, 
Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill 
of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern Historiography, 12 LAW AND HIST. REV. 1 
(1994). 
 35. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of 
the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) (discussing the 
controversy over whether it is proper to use historical evidence from notes of the 
Constitutional Convention to interpret the original meaning of constitutional provisions). 
 36. LARUE, supra note 23, at 20. 
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For these reasons, any “discovery” of original public 
meaning can at best be an interpretation composed of various 
pieces of evidence, i.e., a narrative construction. This narrative 
construction is not necessarily a bad thing, so long as we 
recognize that gap-filling and selectively emphasizing certain 
facts is part of the process. Therefore, discourse on any of the 
various definitions of “interpretation” and “construction,” 
whether stated as broadly theoretical or intensely empirical, 
sooner or later slips into a fictional narrative mode. The point of 
identifying the distinction as a fiction is not to destroy it, but to 
consider how this fictive distinction may still be relevant. 
II. THE UTILITY OF THE 
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION FICTION 
 For some time now, the debate over originalist versus 
nonoriginalist constitutional interpretative methodology has 
been so polarized that audiences of both camps find it hard to 
take a fresh position or to reach those on one or the other side. 
The interpretation/construction distinction, however, offers a 
means of escaping this entrenchment while still preserving the 
essence of the fundamental argument. What the distinction 
creates is a safer, less hostile forum, as well as a new vocabulary, 
for a dialogue among two combatants—originalists and 
nonoriginalists—who otherwise talk past each other. 
How does the interpretation/construction distinction offer a 
means of escaping this entrenchment if it preserves the essence 
of the fundamental argument; wouldn’t the distinction just set up 
the same old arguments in new language? Fair questions. In 
short, the strength of the distinction is in its ability to shift the 
focus of the debate about the constitutional issue from people: 
originalists/nonoriginalists, to activities: interpretation/ 
construction. This allows evaluation of and debate on the merits 
of the offered justification for what the original public meaning 
is (for a particular issue) and whether or not the construction to 
accommodate modern circumstance is an acceptable extra-
polation of that original public meaning. It focuses on process 
and justification rather than on retreat into political ideology: 
(i.e., “That opinion was written by a conservative justice and as a 
political liberal, I’m against it.”). 
In the safer space created by the interpretation/construction 
debate—and with the shared vocabulary of that debate, the 
impasse between originalists and nonoriginalists can be 
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transcended and the discussion edged forward. The new, less-
charged environment allows the methodological camps to talk to 
not at each other. Rather than each camp becoming more 
cemented into familiar points of disagreement, the distinction 
can be used to frame a critical process that unfolds pursuant to a 
mutually accepted sequence of tasks. It begins with a close 
analysis of the text, followed by extended historical-contextual 
research, and then culminates in the legal application of the 
particular constitutional provision that best suits the 
constitutional principle being served and protected in light of 
contemporary circumstances. The distinction then can be used to 
explain how federal courts can maintain alternative 
constitutional constructions that are nevertheless valid and 
binding. 
Additionally, the distinction can be used to explain and, 
depending on the circumstances, justify or criticize the manner in 
which those judicial constitutional constructions create informal 
constitutional change. Keep in mind that just because originalists 
and nonoriginalists may (at least to some degree) accept a 
similar analytical process based on the 
interpretation/construction distinction, this does not mean that 
the outcome of the analysis will always be the same. 
Acknowledging that the distinction, while providing a common 
process, is a fiction allows us to accept that any one 
interpretation being offered is just that, “an” interpretation 
(which alone is no vice) and not “the” interpretation (which 
tends either to hyper-polarize the debate or terminate it 
altogether). We can be skeptical, we can recognize what the 
interpreter has done—constructed a fiction to support his or her 
interpretation—and we can ask if there might be better 
interpretations that could be offered, but we would be wrong to 
argue that there is an interpretive method that does not rely to 
some extent on the mechanics and devices of fiction. To take 
such a position would be tantamount to claiming omniscience on 
all matters related to American social history, economic 
development, political evolution, and linguistic change—a tall 
order. 
The interpretation/construction distinction creates a safe 
haven—a middle ground—between originalism and 
nonoriginalism where constitutional debate and criticism can 
hover between wholly originalist and wholly nonoriginalist 
theories. Moreover, the tension between originalism and 
nonoriginalism, as captured in the slightly tamer debate over 
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interpretation and construction, is fundamentally necessary to 
our constitutional system and the law courts that give sustenance 
to that system. In their pure forms (i.e., strong, hard, or 
extreme), neither originalism nor nonoriginalism provides a 
functional model for judges or, for that matter, non-judicial 
actors in the political arena. The one creates absurd results when 
confronted with distinctly modern constitutional problems, while 
the other results in a kind of constitutional drift, where the 
actual text of the underlying document loses its governing power 
and becomes a mere museum piece without force of law. 
The reality is that originalism cannot wholly survive without 
accepting a certain degree of nonoriginalism, and vice-versa. 
Consider a discussion between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer 
that took place on an episode of “America and the Courts” on 
C-SPAN.37 The Justices traded their views on the interpretation 
of the Constitution in a changing society. The discussion turned, 
inevitably, to the constitutional interpretive methodologies that 
each used to inform how they reached decisions. Justice Scalia 
advocated textualism and originalism while Justice Breyer 
advocated a nonoriginalist approach, which considered the plain 
meaning of the text, but also included other modalities of 
interpretation such as historical practice, structure of the 
Constitution, etc.38 In discussing his judicial philosophy, Justice 
Breyer explained that he believed that ambiguous constitutional 
provisions (like the Equal Protection Clause, freedom of speech, 
or cruel and unusual punishment) represent standards of 
conduct. And that instead of enacting specific conditions, the 
eighteenth century drafters of the Constitution enacted values. 
The difficult question for judges, he continued, becomes not only 
where you draw the line today but how to do this in a way that 
has objective appeal. For Breyer, he said this meant looking at 
the principle and basic value underlying the ambiguous 
constitutional provision and testing that value against modern 
circumstances. 
Justice Scalia attempted to offer a different position. He 
claimed that although the equal protection of the laws could not 
be expanded to include things like same-sex marriage, a judge or 
 
 37. On an episode of “America and the Courts” aired on C-SPAN on October 31, 
2009, Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia spoke about their judicial philosophies 
and their views on the interpretation of the Constitution at the University of Arizona 
School of Law. 
 38. See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 12–13; BOBBITT, FATE, supra 
note 18.  
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justice did have to calculate the trajectory of the original 
provisions when talking about new phenomenon. The moderator 
then asked Justice Scalia about his analysis in one of those 
trajectory cases: Kyllo v. United States.39 Kyllo was a Fourth 
Amendment case that dealt with whether the use of thermal 
technology from outside a residence to measure elevated 
temperatures inside the residence (a sign pointing to the 
probability that marijuana was growing within the house) was an 
unreasonable search. The majority opinion, written by Justice 
Scalia, held that the use of thermal imaging was a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment which required a 
warrant. The moderator asked Justice Scalia to explain how he 
arrived at his decision. 
Scalia’s explanation of his analytical process was rather 
interesting. Justice Scalia said that he arrived at his decision by 
regarding what the Framers would have thought about a 
technique that essentially intrudes into the house without the 
consent of the homeowner to find out what is going on inside. 
He claimed that he started with the plain meaning of the text of 
the Amendment. When the moderator pointed out that the plain 
meaning of the text did not address thermal technology (and 
could not have done so, given that it was drafted in 1791), Scalia 
elaborated. Justice Scalia said that he looked at what type of 
searches and seizures were unlawful at the time, which led him 
to conclude that the underlying value protected by the Fourth 
Amendment was freedom from unreasonable intrusion in the 
home. Next, he considered where the new thermal technology 
fell within that context. Given that the new technology was 
similar in kind to the concrete intrusions the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited and served the underlying value of protecting against 
home intrusion, the Court disapproved of its use without a 
warrant. This prompted Justice Breyer to point out that in terms 
of interpretive methodology he and Justice Scalia were talking 
about the same thing: finding a value, principle, purpose, and 
then applying modern day circumstances, to which Justice Scalia 
responded by retreating to safer territory and repeating a 
familiar slogan of extreme originalism—that a Justice should be 
constrained by the interpretation of the original meaning of the 
text. 
This colloquy between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer 
illustrates a couple of important points about the distinction 
 
 39. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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between interpretation and construction. First, it shows that 
when judges are asked to explain how they actually work their 
way through real-life constitutional issues, they tend to focus 
more on process, not theoretical purity, resulting in a less-heated 
and more candid dialogue that does not immediately put the 
other party into a hyper-defensive mode. Second, it shows that 
the process of judging, at least in the constitutional law context, 
almost always requires a hybrid approach, lest the issue being 
litigated become lost in a parlor game among ideologues. What 
you can start to appreciate in Kyllo is that the disagreement in 
judicial philosophy is essentially one of degree not kind; that 
while the difference is in the degrees of how much weight a 
judge/justice places on the original conditions contained in the 
text and how much weight she places on the underlying value, 
the process is quite similar. Indeed, what one calls “looking for 
what the Framers did” the other can call “looking for the 
values.” What the distinction’s vocabulary permits is for these 
two judicial decisionmakers to effectively agree on the process 
by which a particular constitutional case is adjudicated while 
preserving their right to disagree on the ultimate outcome of the 
litigation—we have contained the tempest and yet benefitted 
from the storm. 
And just as originalism needs a solid dose of nonoriginalism 
to be relevant, nonoriginalism would lapse into a kind of rule-
less relativism if it did not accept the basic originalist premise 
that the text of the Constitution is the necessary starting point 
for a legitimate constitutional analysis. Indeed, in the late 1980s, 
David Hoy and Larry Solum argued effectively that maintaining 
the debate about constitutional interpretation based on a hard 
line distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism was 
ultimately unhelpful because any legitimate theory of American 
constitutional interpretation had to take into account the actual 
words and phrases of the Constitution, as well as the context in 
which those words and phrases were written.40 In other words, 
originalist interpretation is not the mere anachronistic practice 
of applying 220 year-old language to modern problems. It is, on 
the contrary, a necessary act in understanding what the 
Constitution says and means and how it should be applied. 
Originalism helps to maintain the constitutional text as a fixed 
point of navigation, allowing judicial and non-judicial actors to 
 
 40. See David Couzens Hoy, A Hermeneutical Critique of the Originalism/ 
Nonoriginalism Distinction, 15 N. KY. L. REV. 479 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 (1989). 
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negotiate their way through the difficult, often unpredictable 
waters of American civil life. 
Nonoriginalism if unalloyed with originalism diminishes to 
the point of disappearance the role of the Constitution’s text.41 
But however well-intentioned, a constitutional analysis 
unconstrained by the text of the document leads to 
“constitutional drift.”42 We forget what the words of the 
Constitution actually say and instead rely on myths that 
dangerously rephrase the text itself. Some of this happens 
already. For example, many people believe the Constitution 
expressly establishes a separation between church and state. 
Imagine their surprise when confronted with the actual text of 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.43 While 
a separation of church and state can be inferred from these two 
provisions of the First Amendment, one is certainly not spelled 
out with absolute clarity. Institutional convention and public 
expectation require that constitutional debates stay within arm’s 
reach of the text. Without some concrete tether to the text, 
constitutional debate drifts away from the text into 
constitutional “folk lore.”44 Without some level of connection to 
 
 41. This strong form of nonoriginalism was labeled “noninterpretivism.” See 
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706 
(1975). In his article, Grey characterized the two predominant forms of constitutional 
interpretive methodology at the time as “interpretive,” which sees text and original 
intent as constraints on judges, and “noninterpretive,” which sees the court as having an 
“additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair 
treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive 
law in the written Constitution.” The noninterpretivist school accepted the view that 
contemporary understandings could supplement and even supersede the original 
meaning of the Constitution’s text. For literature representative of the interpretivist 
school arguing that constitutional law is not only what can be drawn from the text, but is 
also about enforcing values drawn from somewhere other than the document, see Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 
(1980); Paul Brest, Comment, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661 (1985); Ira C. Lupu, 
Constitutional Theory and the Search for a Workable Premise, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 579, 
583 (1983). 
 42. The noninterpretivism debate, as originally constructed thirty years ago, is in 
essence over today. Indeed, by 1984, Thomas Grey replaced the term “interpretivist” 
with “textualist” noting that his original nomenclature was misleading because 
“noninterprevists” did in fact interpret the law. The use of the term “textualist” Grey 
claimed highlighted the central feature of the relevant disagreement between the two 
camps—the role of the written text in constitutional interpretation. Thomas C. Grey, The 
Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
 43.  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”). 
 44. Few, if any, constitutional theorists deny the binding character of the 
constitutional text itself. And while disagreement remains on how much emphasis to 
place on the text versus other sources, few place exclusive reliance on extratextual 
sources of constitutional justification.  
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or consideration of the text, the distance between the 
Constitution as law and the Constitution as politics becomes too 
great and the tether snaps. 
The interpretation/construction distinction, however, 
accepts a fair amount of hybridizing or mixing of originalist and 
nonoriginalist methods. Indeed, it insists on it as a necessary 
aspect of both judicial and political action. By focusing on the 
actual practice of constitutional application, the interpretation/ 
construction framework allows for discussion of meaningful 
differences, some quite nuanced between originalists and 
nonoriginalists (or, if you prefer, among the various strains of 
originalism—“weak” to “strong”), without the conversation 
devolving into a pitched and endless theoretical battle. In so 
doing, the distinction replaces a taxonomy that has outlived its 
usefulness. 
III. THE INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION FICTION 
PROVIDES A NEW FORUM AND A NEW LANGUAGE 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 
As alluded to above, the distinction between interpretation 
and construction, despite being fictional, adds a practical 
component to the debate between originalism and 
nonoriginalism, and as a result, moves the discussion out of one 
focused on pure theory to one that includes a discussion about 
judicial activity. The distinction sets up something of a two-step 
process: the first step argues for a particular original public 
meaning and the second step implements that original public 
meaning by constructing a judicial rule that can be applied to the 
case at hand (and likely future cases) in a way that both serves 
the current need of the litigants and avoids anachronism.  
So why is that useful? It’s useful because the entire 
enterprise of constitutional interpretation can now take into 
account the actual practice of constitutional application, not just 
the theories constitutional scholars expound in law review 
articles. It embraces the “is” side of the law, not just the “ought 
to” side. When discussing the legitimacy or, more accurately, the 
correctness of a judicial application of a constitutional provision, 
we should at some point consider what the judge/justice actually 
does. What we learn from evaluating judicial activity tells us 
something important about how the constitutional provision is 
being interpreted. By considering the practical realities of 
judicial activity, we frame the debate in a more meaningful 
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structure because it does not limit the discussion to what one 
thinks the law “ought” to be. 
On a more general level, theoretical debates, when infused 
with a bit of practical reality, tend to be more grounded and, 
ultimately, productive. This is probably the greatest benefit 
generated by the interpretation/construction distinction. It 
removes the entire discussion of constitutional application out of 
the rarified air of abstract theory to a place where mutual 
understanding, based on shared experiences, might be reached. 
Although a debate in a completely philosophical and conceptual 
realm is interesting, there is little chance that a purely abstract 
debate will produce significant movement one way or the other. 
It is this possibility of movement—this hope for pushing the 
debate forward to points of greater refinement—that gives the 
debate over interpretation and construction its freshness and 
importance. I think that’s what we may mean when we talk 
about the distinction allowing us to transform but preserve the 
debate in a way that permits us to continue to spin off benefits. 
Indeed, the chances of spin-off benefits resulting from a 
continued purely conceptual discussion are slim. 
In addition to transcending purely abstract philosophical 
debates the distinction may be useful in abandoning what one 
scholar has called “constitutional clichés.”45 In his article, 
Professor Barnett discusses the demise of constitutional catch 
phrases such as “judicial activism, judicial restraint, strict 
construction, Framer’s intent, and dead hand of the past,” 
among others, into constitutional clichés.46 He states that while 
these phrases may have meant something at one time, they are 
now largely “devoid of substance” and “should be abandoned 
even in casual conversation.”47 His central claim is that these 
clichés “[allow] commentators to avoid substantive 
constitutional argument in favor of a process-based analysis that 
can be easily leveled in the absence of any expertise on the issue 
raised by a particular case . . . . [And] they enable commentators 
to criticize the Court or particular decisions without actually 
having to know much about the Constitution itself.”48 The 
advantage of the interpretation/construction distinction is that it 
requires analysis of both process and substance. An analysis of 
both aspects of the distinction: the substantive “what” of 
 
 45. Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 493 (2008). 
 46. Id. at 493. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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interpretation and the procedural “how” of construction 
requires that critiques of judicial decisions tackle more than the 
proper role of the judiciary and deal in some way with the 
mechanics of the legal reasoning in the decision itself. 
Finally, by transforming but preserving the debate, we ward 
against the hegemony of one American constitutional 
interpretative theory. Although, as some have suggested, the 
major differences in American constitutional theory in terms of 
“originalism” and “nonoriginalism,” may be shrinking it is not 
gone and the schism between the two is part of the American 
culture of political debate and has largely defined the historically 
extended tradition of constitutional argument in this country. In 
a certain sense, this tradition of argument and debate provide a 
means through which the American political community can 
address, protect, and reassess changing political and social 
priorities. 
Ironically, this culture of law through argument and debate 
is something that unites Americans as a political community, so 
long as the conflict does not become too polarizing. American 
writer E. L. Doctorow made this point in an essay he wrote in 
1987, the bicentennial of the Philadelphia convention that 
framed the U.S. Constitution: 
[T]he great genius of the convention of 1787 . . . was its 
community of discourse. The law it designed found character 
from the means of its designing. Something arose from its 
deliberations, however, contentious, and that was the 
empowering act of composition given to people who know 
what words mean and how they must be valued. Nobody told 
anybody else to live it or leave it; nobody told anybody else to 
go back where they came from; nobody suggested 
disagreement was disloyalty; and nobody pulled a gun. Ideas, 
difficult ideas, were articulated with language and disputed 
with language and took their final fate, to be passed or 
rejected, as language. . . . This is what we cherish and honor, a 
document that gives us the means by which we may fearlessly 
argue ourselves into clarity as a free and unified people.49 
So, the interpretation/construction distinction fosters the 
discourse about the theoretical differences between originalism 
and alternatives that accepts the idea of a common starting 
ground (original public meaning and historical context) yet still 
 
 49.  E. L. Doctorow, A Citizen Reads the Constitution, THE NATION, Feb. 21, 1987, 
at 208–17, reprinted in E. L. DOCTOROW, JACK LONDON, HEMINGWAY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1977–1992, at 117–38 (1993). 
!!!CISNEROS-271-CONSTITUTIONALINTGERPRETATIONCONSTRUCTION.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)12/10/2010 10:51 AM 
92 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:71 
 
permits proponents of each to argue as to a particular point of 
departure. Ultimately, this framework advances and encourages 
our political culture of argument, permitting discussions and 
disagreements about the theory of American constitutional 
interpretation to continue to spin off benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The academic debate about constitutional interpretation 
can sometimes get trapped in the inaccessible areas of concept 
and abstraction. It is a valuable exercise then to remind oneself 
what the point of the discussion is all about. Ultimately, the 
Constitution is a document that not only secures personal 
liberty, but is also intended to sustain a workable government 
indefinitely. The question that we must keep at the forefront of 
any academic debate is this: How should a society committed to 
the idea of democratic constitutionalism best organize and 
understand itself? And the answer(s) to this question cannot be 
solely theoretical. They must be practical too. For these answers 
will define the role the Constitution will play in contemporary 
American life. 
What the interpretation/construction distinction provides is 
a better forum for continuing the theoretical debate between 
originalism and nonoriginalism, between text and context, 
between those who view the looming presence of the Founding 
Fathers as a necessary preventative against constitutional 
entropy and those who consider those same Founding Fathers 
elitists whose “dead hands” should no longer control the 
outcome of modern civil problems. While there is no agreement 
as to how one locates the line that separates interpretation from 
construction, the distinction between the two activities, however 
fictional, provides an argumentative space that seems to yield 
positive results in terms of constitutional understanding. This is 
likely because the distinction forces those on both sides of the 
debate to adopt a new (and largely shared) vocabulary, a 
different mode of conversing. That is, the 
interpretation/construction distinction provides an alternative to 
the terminology of the old framework, permitting scholars the 
opportunity to conduct a more meaningful discussion about 
constitutional interpretation and implementation. It also directs 
our attention to one of the dominant sources of constitutional 
development—judicial activity—while exposing the tensions 
which exist between that activity and the more political modes of 
constitutional development and application. The distinction also 
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preserves the excellent work and hard-fought battles that have 
brought constitutional theory to its present state. It edges the 
starting point of the debate forward by recognizing that among 
the family of interpretive theories they all share certain 
methodological characteristics as well as a common claim to 
legitimacy. 
Finally, the distinction embraces the idea of law as a culture 
of argument—something that is deeply rooted in the American 
political psyche. Indeed, our true national pastime may not be 
baseball, but arguing over what is and is not “constitutional.”50 
This, I think, is a good thing, as it keeps us in touch with the text 
of the Constitution as much as it keeps us in touch with each 
other. Americans may loathe politics to the point of not wanting 
to vote in national and local elections, but they are not apathetic 
when it comes to the Constitution. There is, I think, a healthy 
distrust among most Americans for those who insist on 
theoretical certitude or ideological purity. This explains, in my 
opinion, why the debate over interpretation and construction 
feels like an advance. It assumes the character of diplomacy and 
negotiation, where the objective is first to identify common 
ground and then to bargain hard on the remaining points of 
disagreement. 
Ultimately, the current debate over the interpretation/ 
construction distinction is healthy and useful, even if the line 
between the two tasks is fictive and indiscernible in any practical 
sense. By bringing the issue of constitutional meaning down 
from the high clouds of theory (originalism versus 
nonoriginalism) onto the firmer ground of judicial practice 
(interpretation versus construction), we have at last begun to 
focus on the Constitution as it governs and shapes real political 
life in the United States. 
 
 
 50. Alexis de Tocqueville himself commented on the American preoccupation with 
all things legal: “There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835).  
